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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE POST-LOPEZ: IT'S NOT DEAD
YET1
Effectuating social change through policy-oriented legislation has
frequently been met with challenges and general skepticism in the United
States. Perhaps the earliest, most famous example of this resistance is
the Civil Rights Cases of 1883.2 This post-Reconstruction decision ef-
fectively nullified the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which was enacted to in-
tegrate and protect recently emancipated slaves.3 Even more importantly,
the Supreme Court in this case severely narrowed the scope of the Four-
teenth Amendment,4 limiting its protective power to restriction of state
I See MONTE PYTHON AND THE SEARCH FOR THE HOLY GRAIL (Krypton International
Corp. 1974). In this comedic film, the following conversation takes place during the time
of the Black Plague:
Undertaker: "Bring out your dead."
Young Man: "Here's one."
Undertaker: "Ninepence."
Old Man: "I'm not dead yet."
Undertaker: "What?"
Young Man: "Nothing, here's your ninepence."
Old Man: "I'm not dead."
Undertaker: "He says he's not dead."
Young Man: "Yes he is."
Old Man: "I'm not."
Undertaker: "He isn't."
Young Man: "Well, he's very ill."
Old Man: "I'm getting better."
Young Man: "No you're not, you'll be stone dead in a moment."
Id. Some courts would have the Commerce Clause die before its time, like the characters
in this comedy.
2 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 13 (1883) (declaring that the Four-
teenth Amendment is not "a code of municipal law regulative of all private rights between
man and man in society.").
See J. Clay Smith, Jr., Shifts of Federalism and Its Implications for Civil Rights, 39
How. L.J. 737, 738 (1996) (describing that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was designed to
prevent discrimination in places with public accommodations).
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property; without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
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action alone, thus excluding private action from its reach. 5 In so hold-
ing, the Court stonewalled access to the clearest and most logical source
of federal social-policy 6 legislation in the United States Constitution; the
amendment was, after all, designed to facilitate socialization of freed
slaves and equal access to American society. Since then, Congress has
been forced to ground its power in less obvious sources-often the
7Commerce Clause. For instance, when an effective civil rights act was
ultimately passed in 1964, it was enacted under the aegis of the Com-
merce Clause in order that it reach private, as well as state, discrimina-
tion.8 Use of the Commerce Clause to enact social-policy legislation has
been challenged time and again, yet throughout the twentieth century the
Supreme Court has deferred to Congress's actions. 9 With the decision in
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11. The Court declared that:
It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual in-
vasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment....
It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the
regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the op-
eration of State laws.., when these are subversive of the fundamental
rights specified in the amendment.
Id. The Fourteenth Amendment had the potential to facilitate the elimination of discrimi-
nation, but it was interpreted too narrowly by the Court to give the federal government
the kind of power it needed to alter existing racism and discrimination. See GEOFFREY R.
STONE E AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 485-86 (2d ed. 1991).
6 See WEBsTER's TIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2161 (1993). "Social" is
defined as "of or relating to human society... of or relating to the interaction of the in-
dividual and the group.., of, relating to, or concerned with the welfare of human beings
as members of society." Id. "Policy" is defined as "prudence or wisdom in the man-
agement of public and private affairs... a definite course or method of action selected
(as by a government, institution, group, or individual) from among alternatives and in the
light of given conditions to guide and usu. determine present and future decisions ..
Id. at 1754.
The term "social-policy" is used in this Note as a combination of these definitions,
meaning government action, policy, or legislation that is aimed toward redefining or
changing some evil in American society.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides that the United
States Congress "shall have Power... [tio regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Id.; see also Larry E. Gee, Fed-
eralism Revisited: The Supreme Court Resurrects the Notion of Enumerated Powers by
Limiting Congress's Attempt to Federalize Crime, 27 ST. MARY's L.J. 151, 168 (1995).
The author notes that "the Commerce Clause evolved into a conduit for national efforts to
reform social problems that had not been adequately addressed by the states." Id.
8 See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 149 (12th ed. 1991) (relaying Attor-
ney General Robert F. Kennedy's conviction that use of the Commerce Clause would
render the Civil Rights Act clearly constitutional, whereas the Fourteenth Amendment
was a riskier source of power).
9 See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971) (affirming defen-
dant's conviction under the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 for loan sharking);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 246 (1964) (upholding Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause
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United States v. Lopez,10 however, the Supreme Court may have blocked
once again Congress's power to create policy-oriented, socially useful
legislation. The lower federal courts seem to be divided, though, on how
to interpret Lopez. While some courts consider Lopez a watershed that
changes the face of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, others deem the
case noteworthy only because it was the first Supreme Court decision in
sixty years to strike down legislation based on the Commerce Clause. 11
This Note focuses on two important pieces of social-policy legisla-
tion that could be affected by Lopez: the Violence against Women Act
(VAWA)12 and the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
(FACE). 13 Conflicts exist in the lower federal courts regarding the con-
stitutionality of both statutes, which were enacted under the Commerce
Clause. 14 This Note seeks to resolve the dispute in favor of upholding
both acts. Part I surveys the major cases in the history of the Commerce
Clause as they relate to social-policy legislation, up to and including
Lopez. Part II discusses the conflicting cases in the district courts and
courts of appeals regarding VAWA and FACE and the different interpre-
tations that lower courts have given Lopez. Part III suggests policy rea-
sons why VAWA and FACE should be upheld. Part IV concludes that
even if Lopez does change the scope of Commerce Clause power, and the
deference that courts apply to that power, these two acts should still be
upheld, as the majority of lower courts have already confirmed the con-
stitutionality of the statutes.
I. HISTORY OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Use of the Commerce Clause by Congress as support for legislation
has progressed, at least in the context of social-policy legislation, through
two major stages. The first stage involved cases that developed a tradi-
tion of judicial deference to congressional power. 15  Within this stage
there were two phases. The first phase involved the evolution of the
power).
10 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
11 See infra Part II, §§ A & B (discussing the dichotomies in the case law as they
pertain to the statutes discussed in this Note).
12 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)
13 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
14 Compare United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming the
constitutionality of FACE), and Jane Doe v. John Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 613, 615 (D.
Conn. 1996) (upholding the constitutionality of VAWA) with Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F.
Supp. 791, 819 (W.D.N.C. 1996) (determining that FACE is an unconstitutional exercise
of Congress's Commerce Clause power), and Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State
Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 801 (W.D. Va. 1996) (declaring VAWA unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause).
15 See infra notes 20-52 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 28:182
1997] COMMERCE CLA USE 185
scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The second
phase, which began after the Civil Rights Act of 1964,16 established ju-
dicial deference to social-policy legislation. 17 The second stage of Com-
merce Clause common law started after Lopez, which was the first case in
sixty years to strike down federal legislation enacted under the Commerce
Clause.' 8  Since Lopez, federal courts have shown less deference to the
Commerce Clause as an underlying basis for federal legislation. 19
A. Pre-Civil Rights Act Precedents
The first Supreme Court case to decide the scope of congressional
20power under the Commerce Clause was Gibbons v. Ogden, which was
possibly the most expansive interpretation ever of Congress's power.
The case involved a dispute over the navigable waters of New York and
New Jersey. 21 Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton were granted exclu-
sive rights by the State of New York to operate their steamboats on the
Hudson River. 22 Their privilege was assigned to Ogden, the plaintiff,
who filed suit to enjoin Thomas Gibbons from running steamboats be-
tween the two states, in violation of New York's exclusive grant to 0
den.23 Gibbons, however, was licensed to operate under a federal act.
This created a conflict between state and federal law.25 The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, articulated the full
meaning of the Commerce Clause's individual words. 2 6 The Chief Jus-tice expounded that "commerce" meant more than just trade; it meant
16 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 43 U.S.C.).
17 See infra notes 53-83 and accompanying text.
18 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act as unconstitutional); see also Michael Bablo, Note, Leslie Salt Co. v.
United States: Does the Recent Supreme Court Decision in United States v. Lopez Dic-
tate the Abrogation of the "Migratory Bird Rule"?, 14 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 277,
277-78 (1995). The author wrote, "[tihe Lopez decision is the first time in approximately
60 years that the Supreme Court has found that Congress does not have the power to
regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause." Id.; see also Charles B. Schweitzer, Com-
ment, Street Crime, Interstate Commerce, and the Federal Docket: The Impact of United
States v. Lopez, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 71, 71 (1995) (commenting that "Lopez is significant
because it invalidated a federal law under the Commerce Clause for the first time since
1936-).
19 See infra notes 96-176 and accompanying text.
20 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
21 See id. at 2.
22 See id. at 1-2.
23 See id. at2.
24 See id.
25 See id. at 2-3.
26 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189-97.
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"intercourse" as well. 27 This necessarily denoted commerce both with-
out and within the states, as per the word "among." 23 Chief Justice
Marshall then interpreted the word "regulate" to mean that Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause is plenary. 29  The Chief Justice
thereby determined that the power to regulate, vested in Congress by the
Constitution, is complete and unrestricted. 30 The Court further explained
that democratic government, not the judiciary, is the check on the exer-
cise of congressional power.
The underlying premise of Gibbons, therefore, is that the Commerce
Clause power is restricted only by the political process and not by the
courts. Interestingly, Chief Justice Marshall maintained that this was not
an interpretation; the Chief Justice wrote that the opinion merely articu-
lated what the Constitution already presented. 32 Yet, in this mere articu-
lation, the Court introduced what was, and what has remained, the
27 See id. at 189-90. These are the famous words: "Commerce, undoubtedly, is
traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial inter-
course between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by pre-
scribing rules for carrying on that intercourse." Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 194. The Chief Justice wrote that "[clomprehensive as the word
'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more
States than one." Id.
29 See id. at 196 (declaring that the power to regulate is "complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed
in the constitution.").
30 See id.
31 See id. The Chief Justice went so far as to state that:
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people,
and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this,
as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole
restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They
are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all repre-
sentative governments.
Id. at 197.
32 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 187-88. Chief Justice Marshall discussed the idea of strict
constructionism as advanced by certain members of the bar, but found there was nothing
in the Constitution that dictated strictly construing the enumerated powers of Congress.
See id. The Chief Justice then described using the natural sense of the words in the
Constitution. The Court wrote:
If ... there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given
power, it is a well settled rule, that the objects for which it was given, es-
pecially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should
have great influence in the construction .... We know of no rule for con-
struing the extent of such powers, other than is given by the language of
the instrument which confers them, taken in connexion [sic] with the pur-
poses for which they were conferred.
Id. at 188-89.
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broadest interpretation of the Commerce Clause ever announced by the
Supreme Court.33
The next notable step in the first phase of Commerce Clause inter-
pretation, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. , was decided over
100 years after Gibbons. At issue in Jones & Laughlin was the scope of
the power of the National Labor Relations Board to enforce an order
prohibiting corporate discrimination against employees attempting to un-
ionize. 35  Expanding upon prior decisions, Chief Justice Hughes deter-
mined that interstate activities "by reason of close and intimate relation
to interstate commerce" could be placed under federal control .36 The
Chief Justice reasoned that there was a need for federal regulation in or-
der (1) to prevent interference with interstate commerce and (2) to pro-
mote efficiency. The Court refused to inspect the effects on commerce
"in a vacuum," and instead, enunciated that interstate commerce is a
"practical conception" that "must be appraised by a judgment that does
not ignore actual experience. " 3  The Court's pragmatic approach ex-
panded the idea that the Court would not limit the power of the federal
government under the Commerce Clause and virtually eliminated judicial
control over Commerce Clause interpretation. 39  This case also created
the substantial effect language that would become the standard in Com-
merce Clause analysis. 40
The trend of deference to congressional decisions regarding regula-
tion of interstate commerce continued in Wickard v. Filburn, decided
during World War II, in the aftermath of the Great Depression. Wickard
involved a challenge to wheat production quotas set by the Department of
Agriculture in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.42 Filburn was
an Ohio wheat farmer who regularly grew excess wheat outside of what
33 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMEwCAN CONSTITnTONAL LAW 306 (2d ed. 1988).
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
35 See id. at 22.
36 Id. at 37.
37 See id. at 38.
38 Id. at 41.
39 See TRIBE, supra note 33, at 309 (stating that the "Supreme Court has exercised
little independent judgment [in this area], choosing instead to defer to the expressed or
implied findings of Congress").
40 See id. (noting that since Jones & Laughlin, the Court has deferred to congres-
sional findings whenever "the regulated activities have the requisite 'substantial economic
effect."); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (recognizing that,
.consistent with the great weight of case law," Congress may regulate an activity which
"substantially affects" interstate commerce).
41 317 U.S. Ill (1942).
42 See id. at 113-14; 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1407 (1988).
19971
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he marketed in order to feed his livestock and his family. 43 Although
Filburn received notice of his annual wheat allotment in 1940, he ex-
ceeded his designated number of bushels for 1941 and refused to pay a
fine for such excess. 44 The articulated purpose of the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act of 1938 was to regulate interstate and international com-
merce in wheat so as to prevent either a surplus or shortage in wheat
supply, and in so doing, the Act would regulate prices. The question
before the Court was whether Congress exceeded its power under the
Commerce Clause by regulating wheat production that was not for mar-
ket, but solely for personal consumption.4
In the decision, the Court rearticulated Chief Justice Marshall's de-
termination in Gibbons that the political process, not the judicial system,
is the vehicle for creating limitations on congressional Commerce Clause
power.47 Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, created a test for de-
termining whether Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power."
After acknowledging the plenary power Congress had over commerce,
Justice Jackson stated that as long as federal legislation had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce, either direct or indirect, the Supreme
Court would uphold it. 49 If satisfied, the Supreme Court would afford
deference to such legislation.50 This case continued the extremely broad
interpretations articulated in Gibbons5 1 by Chief Justice Marshall and set
52forth in Jones & Laughlin by Chief Justice Hughes.
A groundwork of Commerce Clause jurisprudence was thus laid
through the precedents set in Gibbons, Jones & Laughlin, and Wickard.
43 See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114-15.
4 See id.
See id.
46 See id. at 118.
47 See id. at 120. The Court further acknowledged that "Ithe power of Congress
over interstate commerce is plenary and complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution."
Id. at 124 (citation omitted).
48 See Wlckard, 317 U.S. at 125.
49 See id. In articulating the test, the Court wrote:
But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded
as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irre-
spective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have
been defined as "direct" or "indirect."
Id.
so See id.
51 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196-(1824) (declaring that the power to regulate
is "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limita-
tions, other than are prescribed in the constitution.").
See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
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This first era of Commerce Clause decisions set the tone for even more
expansive future interpretations. Proceeding from the deferential deci-
sion in Gibbons, the Supreme Court provided the federal government the
space it needed to make socially fruitful legislation. This tradition of
deference became extremely important in the next phase of the first
stage---the cases addressing the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Ensuing Case Law
The stated purpose of the Civil Rights Act'of 1964 (the Act)53 was
to create a peaceful solution to "the persistent problem of racial and re-
ligious discrimination or segregation by establishments doing business
with the general public, and by labor unions and professional, business,
and trade associations." 54 Congress realized that racism and discrimina-
tion were nationwide problems that had to be eliminated at the national
level. 55 Because the activities being regulated were both related to na-
tional commerce, Congress justified the Act under the Commerce
Clause. 56 The history of the Act reveals awareness that use of the Com-
53 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 43 U.S.C.).
54 S. REP. No. 872, at 1 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2355.
55 See id. at 1, 8, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2362. Eliminating dis-
crimination was a part of both major parties' platforms, but it was the nationwide cam-
paign of civil disobedience that acted as a catalyst by really pressing politicians to take
action. See id. at 8-9, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2363. This was evidenced
by President Kennedy's speech to Congress on June 19, 1963, in which he said:
Events of recent weeks have again underlined how deeply our Negro citi-
zens resent the injustice of being arbitrarily denied equal access to those
facilities and accommodations which are otherwise open to the general
public. That is a daily insult which has no place in a country proud of its
heritage .... Surely, in 1963, 100 years after emancipation, it should not
be necessary for any American citizen to demonstrate in the streets for op-
portunity to stop at a hotel, or eat at a lunch counter in the very department
store in which he is shopping, or to enter a motion picture house, on the
same terms as any other customer.
Id.
56 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 43 U.S.C.). The Act provides for in-
junctive relief against any establishment found to discriminate "on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin," provided the establishment "is a place of public ac-
commodation" and its operations affect interstate commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)-(c)
(1988) (establishing the criteria for determining whether the operations of an establish-
ment affect interstate commerce). Among the establishments included within the Act are
hotels and restaurants. See id. § 2000(b). Studies concluded that segregation was detri-
mental to the national economy, as it was "economically wasteful," and further, that
"[i]ntolerance is a species of boycott and any business or job boycott is a cancer in the
economic body of the Nation." S. REP. No. 872, at 11 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2365.
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merce Clause to effectuate societal change might be challenged, but also
knowledge that socially-oriented objectives would not render use of the
Commerce Clause power any less valid.
57
The Act became law on July 2, 1964. 58 By October of the same
year, two cases challenging the constitutionality of the Act reached the
Supreme Court. The first of the two was Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States."' In Heart of Atlanta and in violation of the act, a motel
refused to rent rooms to African Americans. 6 0 The motel owner brought
an action to enjoin enforcement of the Act, claiming that Congress had
exceeded the scope of its power under the Commerce Clause. 61 The
Court, however, declared that Congress had the constitutional power to
prevent such socially disgraceful practices. 62
Looking to the history of the Act, Justice Clark noted that other
civil rights acts had been enacted after the Civil War and in various years
since, but none were so extensive as the one signed in 1964 by President
Johnson. 63 The Justice noted that the principles used for scrutinizing Ti-
tle II, the section of the Act addressing public accommodations, were
based on the Gibbons decision. 64 Considering the increase in interstate
travel since Gibbons, the Justice wrote that legislation prohibiting dis-
crimination that has an adverse effect on interstate travel would be even
57 S. REP. No. 872, at 13 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2367.
Congress requested opinions from legal scholars regarding the constitutionality of the
Act. The overwhelming response was that:
"The commerce power is clearly adequate and appropriate. No impropri-
ety need be felt in using the commerce clause as a response to deep moral
concern." Where social injustices occur in commercial activities the com-
merce clause has been used to prevent discrimination... [and] it has been
used to reach intrastate activities if they have a substantial effect
(individually or cumulatively) upon commerce.... Congress, in the exer-
cise of its plenary power over interstate commerce, may regulate com-
merce or that which affects it for other than purely economic goals....
The fact that [the Act] would accomplish socially oriented objectives by aid
of commerce clause powers would not detract from its validity. There are
many instances in which Congress has discouraged practices which it
deems evil, dangerous, or unwise by a regulation of interstate commerce.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in scattered sections of
20 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 43 U.S.C.).
59 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
60 See id. at 249.
61 See id. at 243-44.
62 See id. at 246. The Court wrote, "Congress was not restricted by the fact that the
particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing was also deemed a
moral and social wrong." Id. at 257.
63 See id. at 245.
64 See id. at 253-54.
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more justified in relying on the Commerce Clause than legislation ad-
dressing interstate steamboat traffic. 6 Building on Chief Justice Mar-
shall's exposition on "intercourse," Justice Clark stated that the social-
policy goals of Congress did not render the regulation of the interstate
activity any less legitimate. 66
This language was key to upholding the Civil Rights Act. The
Court not only acknowledged the social-policy goals of Congress, but
also deferred to the Congressional determination that racial discrimina-
tion had a significant effect on interstate commerce. 67 The Court ex-
pounded further that the power to regulate commerce includes the ability
to regulate "local incidents thereof." 68 As such, preventing a motel
owner from excluding African Americans was well within the scope of
69Congress's power.
Justice Clark concluded by noting that while Congress may have had
other means of preventing discrimination, it was not the role of the Court
to interfere with Congress's discretion in such matters.70  The only re-
quirement imposed by the Court was satisfaction of the traditional ra-
tional relation test, which holds that the means chosen by Congress must
be reasonably related to the desired ends. 1 Satisfied that this test had
been met, the Court continued its tradition of deference to legislative de-
cisions in matters involvin regulation of social-policy issues through use
of the Commerce Clause.
65 See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 251.
66 See id. at 257. Justice Clark declared:
That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs... rendered its en-
actments no less valid. In framing Title II of this Act Congress was also
dealing with what it considered a moral problem. But that fact does not
detract from the overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that racial
discrimination has had on commercial intercourse. It was this burden
which empowered Congress to enact appropriate legislation, and ...
Congress was not restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to
interstate commerce... was also deemed a moral and social wrong.
Id. (emphasis added).
6 See id. at 257-58.
68 See id. at 258. The Court wrote:
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the
regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities in-
trastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of
Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end ....
Id. 4citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941)).
See id. at261.
70 See id. at 261-62.
71 See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 261 (holding that "the means chosen by
[Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.").
72 See id.
192 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:182
Katzenbach v. McClung,73 the companion case to Heart of Atlanta,
involved a restaurant that refused to serve African Americans at its ta-
bles. 74 The restaurant was subsequently charged with a violation of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 75 Referring to the reasoning in Heart of At-
lanta, the Court held that the Commerce Clause provided a legitimate
source of power to validate the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7 6 More impor-
tantly, Justice Clark, writing for the majority, relied on the history of the
Act and the findings made by Congress regarding the sweeping purpose
of the Act.77
The Court announced that it was not necessary for Congress to
make formal findings about the effects of the Act on commerce and that
the hearings delineated well enough Congress's need to rely on the
Commerce Clause. 78 Finally, the Court reiterated the view that Congress
has plenary power in regulating commerce under the Commerce Clause.79
As such, the Court continued, where Congress does not violate some
other express clause in the Constitution, any rational purpose for using
the Commerce Clause is valid.80
For decades to come, the precedent set in these two cases created a
tradition of deference to congressional action taken under the auspices of
the Commerce Clause." The Court time and again declared that a ra-
tional relationship was all that was required for Congress to regulate
commerce and that the power to regulate was expansive.8 2 When creat-
73 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
74 See id. at 296 (noting that the restaurant provided only take-out service for African
Americans).
75 See id. at 295.
76 See id. at 301 (stating that racial discrimination is a nationwide problem, not a local
or regional one).
77 See id.
7S See id. at 303-04 (discussing that while congressional findings do not preclude the
Court from investigating whether interstate activity is affected, if the Court does examine
the legislation, the Court is only seeking a rational relationship between the means and the
ends.
V. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 305.
See id.
1 Cf. Schweitzer, supra note 18, at 71 (commenting that "Lopez is significant be-
cause it invalidated a federal law under the Commerce Clause for the first time since
1936").
82 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
In Hodel, the Court once more recognized that deference will be given to rational findings
that certain activities have an effect on commerce. See id. at 276 (relying on Heart of
Atlanta and Katzenbach).
The line of cases that established such deference is too extensive to recount here, but
the cases aforementioned are frequently cited for the notions of deference and the rational
relationship test. See, e.g., Victoria Davis, Note, A Landmark Lost: The Anemic Impact
of United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), on the Federalization of Criminal
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ing social-policy legislation, Congress had over a century's worth of case
law on which to rely and knew how to prevent enactments from being
declared unconstitutional. Federal courts, using the same jurisprudence,
also understood the degree of deference afforded social-lolicy legislation.
Then, a controversial decision, United States v. Lopez, threw both the
lower federal courts and Congress into a quagmire.
C. Lopez: Watershed or Anomaly?
The infamous Lopez case was decided in a political climate of Re-
publican downsizing that desired decentralization of the federal govern-
ment. 84 This climate still exists today and sheds some light on the cur-
rent composition of a Supreme Court that may have narrowed the scope
of the Commerce Clause. 5 In United States v. Lopez, 6 the Court was
confronted with a challenge to the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.87
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Court, created a
three-part analysis for determining legitimate exercises of Commerce
Clause power." The majority wrote:
[Wie have identified three broad categories of activity that Congress
may regulate under its commerce power. First, Congress may regu-
late the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress
is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though
the threat may come only from intrastate activity. Finally, Congress'
commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities
Law, 75 NEB. L. REv. 117, 120-28 (1996); Bablo, supra note 18, at 283-88; Schweitzer,
sup.ra note 18, at 83-95.
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
84 See id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing the need to curb Congress's
Commerce Clause power).
85 See STONE, supra note 5, at lvii-lxxiv. The Supreme Court, in 1964, consisted of
Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Clark, Justice Black, Justice Douglas, Justice Gold-
berg, Justice Brennan, Justice Frankfurter, Justice Harlan, and Justice Stewart. See id.
Under the stewardship of Chief Justice Warren, the Court leaned far toward the "liberal"
side, and away from strict constructionism. However, the makeup of the Supreme Court
in 1995 is far different. The Chief Justice at the time the Court decided Lopez, William
H. Rehnquist, was substantially more conservative than Chief Justice Warren, and the
remainder of the Court consisted of Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia,
Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, Justice Thomas, Justice Ginsberg, and Justice Breyer.
See Staci Rosche, How Conservative Is the Rehnquist Court? Three Issues, One Answer,
65 FORDHAm L. REv. 2685, 2727 (1997). The Rehnquist Court has made 42.8%
"liberal" decisions in the area of civil liberties, while the Warren Court had a rate of
71.4%. See id. at 2727, 2745 n.303.
96 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
87 See id. at 551. The Act made it an offense knowingly to "possess a firearm at a
place" classified as a "school zone." Id.
89 See id. at 558.
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having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activi-
ties that substantially affect interstate commerce.
8 9
Using the above analysis, the Court struck down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act. 9° The part of this analysis that seems most contro-
versial and will most significantly affect the legislation discussed in this
Note is the third prong: the substantial relation test.
91
While the three-category approach would seem to narrow the ability
of Congress to create legislation under the Commerce Clause, there is an
important loophole that will enable Congress to continue legislating-
congressional findings. The Court mentioned, almost in passing, that if
Congress had made formal findings concerning the legislation, the Gun-
Free School Zones Act might have been upheld. 92 It is this dicta regard-
ing congressional findings that may now enable some courts to continue
to defer to legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
93
Other courts, however, cite the three-category test as a complete
turnaround in Commerce Clause analysis that narrowed Congress's
power. 94  Although Lopez cannot be overlooked, neither can the 170
years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that preceded Lopez. 95 It is no
longer virtually guaranteed, however, that legislation enacted under the
Commerce Clause will be upheld automatically by the courts. It is in
light of this uncertainty that courts are now examining the statutes at is-
sue in this Note.
89 Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
90 See id. at 551.
91 See id. at 559. The Court declared that the third category of activities that Con-
gress may regulate under the Commerce Clause includes "those activities having a sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce." Id. at 558-59. The Court explained that
whether an activity falls within the third category "requires an analysis of whether the
regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce." Id. at 559.
2 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. The Court stated that under Katzenbach, formal
findings are not always necessary, but that where the effects of an activity on commerce
are not readily apparent, Congress should clarify its determination with findings so the
courts may understand its reasoning. See id. at 562-63; see also Betty S. Diener, Recent
Case, 55 MD. L. REv. 963, 968 (1996) (stating that the Court in Lopez placed emphasis
on the importance of legislative findings).
93 See United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 1995); Jane Doe v. John
Doe 929 F. Supp. 608, 615 (D. Conn. 1996).
See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 787
(W.D. Va. 1996); Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791, 806 n.5 (W.D.N.C. 1996).
95 See United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that although
Lopez stands out as only one of a few cases since 1935 in which the Court found Con-
gress exceeded its Commerce Clause power, the Court did not overturn all prior Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence).
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II. CONFLICT IN THE COURTS
The Violence against Women Act (VAWA) 96 and the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) were enacted as part of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.98 Both of
these statutes were enacted under the auspices of the Commerce Clause,
and the constitutional basis of both has been challenged. District and cir-
cuit courts are not in agreement about how Commerce Clause power may
be used in light of Lopez, but as the following discussion reveals, the
majority of cases agree that Congress still has plenary power to enact
social-policy legislation.
A. The Violence against Women Act
There has been less commentary surrounding the constitutional va-
lidity of VAWA than there has been surrounding FACE. Perhaps this is
because its subject is less politically charged and more widely condemned
as a universal evil than that action addressed by FACE. VAWA99 was
96 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)
97 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
98 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
99 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (a)-(e). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) Purpose: Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this
part under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as
well as under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose of
this part to protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence
and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting interstate
commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims
of crimes of violence motivated by gender.
(b) Right to be free from crimes of violence: All persons within the
United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence moti-
vated by gender (as defined in subsection (d) of this section).
(c) Cause of Action: A person (including a person who acts under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who
commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives an-
other of the right declared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to
the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and puni-
tive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a
court may deem appropriate.
(d) Definitions: For purposes of this section-
(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a
crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of
gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's
gender; and
(2) the term "crime of violence" means-
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony
against the person or that would constitute a felony against
property if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical
injury to another, and that would come within the meaning
of State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of Title
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enacted in order to extend civil rights for women beyond the workplace
and into the home and streets by making crimes against women a viola-
tion of their civil rights.l°° The Act federalized both crimes of domestic
violence and violations of protection orders. 101 Testimony before con-
gressional subcommittees made it clear that local and state law simply
were not adequately protecting victims of domestic violence. 1' 2 In order
to qualify for federal regulation, however, the crimes had to be interstate
criminal offenses.l13 It is this aspect of VAWA that has created conflict-
ing opinions in federal district courts.
The first case to address the constitutionality of VAWA was Jane
Doe v. John Doe.104  In Jane Doe, a wife sued her husband under
VAWA for violating her federal rights by subjecting her to domestic
violence, a gender-based crime.105  Her husband sought to dismiss the
action by challenging the authority of Congress to enact the legislation. 1
06
18, whether or not those acts have actually resulted in
criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction and whether or
not those acts were committed in the special maritime, terri-
torial, or prison jurisdiction of the United States; and
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a
felony described in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship
between the person who takes such action and the individual
against whom such action is taken.
(e) Limitation and Procedures
(1) Limitation: Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause
of action under subsection (c) of this section for random acts of
violence unrelated to gender or for acts that cannot be demon-
strated, by a preponderance of the evidence, to be motivated by
gender (within the meaning of subsection (d) of this section).
Id.
100 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801, 1853. Subtitle C provides that "Congress has found that crimes of
violence motivated by gender constitute bias crimes in violation of the victim's right to be
free from discrimination on the basis of gender...." Id.
101 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
102 See Michelle W. Easterling, For Better for Worse: The Federalization of Domestic
Violence, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 933, 938-39, 941 (1996) (explaining that local police fre-
quently hesitate to arrest in domestic situations because they do not want to interfere in
the home). Congressional testimony indicates that gender-motivated crime is not ad-
dressed in state courts; that some states still do not recognize rape of a wife by her hus-
band; and that in some states, wives may not sue their husbands after being assaulted due
to the interspousal immunity doctrine. See id. at 941 (discussing the congressional testi-
mony of Sally Goldfarb of the National Organization of Women).
See id. at 934-35. VAWA "created two new federal criminal offenses: interstate
domestic violence and interstate violation of a protection order." Id. at 935.
104 929 F. Supp. 608, 610 (D. Conn. 1996). Because this was the first time the statute
was considered, both the federal government and several organizations that advocate
women's rights were allowed to intervene on behalf of the plaintiff. See id. at 610 & n.2.
105 Seeid. at610&n.2.
106 See id. at 610.
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In evaluating the constitutionality of VAWA, the court examined the
history, findings, and hearings that were conducted prior to the law's en-
actment.10 7  After utilizing the analysis from Lopez and focusing solely
on the third prong,' °8 the court found that VAWA was an appropriate ex-
ercise of congressional power. 19
Most important to the court in distinguishing VAWA from the Gun-
Free School Zones Act, which was held to be unconstitutional in
Lopez,110 was the degree of analysis and extent of the findings made by
Congress prior to enacting VAWA.111 Because of the statistical, medi-
cal, and economic information that was collected by Congress, the court
was able to find a rational basis for Congress's findings that there was a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.1 2  Thus, the Jane Doe court
concluded that VAWA was a permissible use of Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause.
1 3
A month after the Jane Doe decision, a conflicting opinion was an-
nounced in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University.
11 4
The court in Brzonkala applied the test from Lopez and held that VAWA
was an invalid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power.11 5 Con-
trary to the holding in Jane Doe, the Brzonkala court held that the find-
ings made by Congress in its enactment of VAWA were insufficient to
sustain the scrutiny of the Lopez substantial relation test.1 16  Instead of
107 See id.
108 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). The third prong of
Lopez recognizes that the power to regulate under the Commerce Clause extends to
"those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." Id.
109 See Jane Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613, 615. The court reviewed the holding in Lopez
and determined that although Lopez acknowledged that Commerce Clause power has lim-
its, it did not overturn the rationality test that was established in Hodel. See id. (citing
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 425 U.S. 264, 276-80 (1981)).
110 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
See Jane Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 615. Recall that the Court in Lopez hinted that if
Congress had made findings evidencing a stronger link between students with guns and
interstate commerce, the law might have been upheld. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. In
the case of VAWA, Congress made very specific findings regarding the detrimental ef-
fects of violence against women on commerce. See Jane Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 611. The
district court noted, for example, that "[glender based violence bars its most likely tar-
gets-women- from full participation in the national economy.... [Sltudies report that
almost 50% of rape victims lose their job or are forced to quit in the aftermath of the
crime." Id. at 613 (citation omitted).
112 See Jane Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 615.
113 See id.
114 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
115 See id. at 801.
116 See id. at 786-93; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (recognizing that Congress may
"regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce"). The
court's analysis in Brzonkala compared the similarities and differences between the en-
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analyzing the congressional findings or performing a Commerce Clause
analysis, however, the Brzonkala court simply compared its case to the
situation in Lopez and concluded that the case at hand was similarly un-
convincing as a valid exercise of power under the Commerce Clause.
1 1 7
Perhaps this tactic would have sufficed if the court had examined the rec-
ord as a whole, but the opinion instead chose to focus on findings that it
found particularly weak; this resulted in a judgment invalidating
VAWA.
The Supreme Court stated in Lopez that it was not overruling or de-
nying all prior Commerce Clause precedent, 1 9 yet the Brzonkala court
relied solely on Lopez. 120 If the district court actually adhered to Lopez
as strictly as it thought it had, the court would have realized that it
should have considered all of Commerce Clause common law and not just
Lopez. 121 The final line of the court's analysis even stated, "[a] reason-
able adherence to Lopez reveals that VAWA is not a proper use of the
commerce power." 1
22
actment of the Gun-Free School Zones Act and VAWA. Id. at 789-93. The court con-
cluded that the differences were insignificant, but that the similarities were overwhelming.
See id. at 789. The court's analysis is unconvincing, however, as it made statements such
as, "[t]he commerce power is based on a reasonable effect on interstate commerce, not
on Congress's perceived effect on commerce." Id. But it is well established that the
legislature determines whether an activity affects commerce such that Congress may
regulate in that area, subject only to a rational basis test by the courts. See Katzenbach v.
McClung, 370 U.S. 294, 301 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 258-59 (1964); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196-97 (1824). The Brzonkala
court seems to have ignored that fact. See 935 F. Supp. at 789-90.
117 See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 791.
118 See id. at 792-93. The court examined the findings Congress made about effects
on interstate commerce and decided that an effect on the national economy is not the same
as an effect on interstate commerce. See id. at 792. The court then accepted the defen-
dants' argument that insomnia costs the national economy more than domestic abuse
does, but to allow the federal government to regulate insomnia would take away too much
power from the states. See id. at 792-93. The argument is inept, though, because in-
somnia is not a crime that has traditionally been ignored or denied by the states, who are
supposed to regulate crime. Furthermore, insomnia is not imposed on one gender by
another, nor inflicted upon one person by another, as are domestic violence and rape.
Victims of such crimes are forced to cease work due to the trauma they have suffered,
which was the point made in testimony to Congress about the effects on interstate com-
merce and the national economy. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385-86 (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801, 1853-54. The annual economic cost of the prob-
lem is not the focus of the findings, so the analogy is questionable. Furthermore, to com-
pare domestic violence and rape to insomnia is to trivialize both the magnitude of the
problem and the severity of the crimes.
119 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (stating that the tests the majority was enunciating were
"consistent with the great weight of our case law").
120 See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 788-92.
121 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-59.
122 See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 793.
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The Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach Courts noted in dicta that the
social-policy aspect of legislation does not prevent such legislation from
representing a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power. 123 Courts
should well remember the dicta in those two Supreme Court cases when
examining VAWA. Congress held lengthy hearings and made extensive
findings before enacting VAWA, as was encouraged in Lopez.124 Be-
cause the Jane Doe court noted and relied on congressional findings and
the Brzonkala court essentially ignored them, Jane Doe's reasoning is
more consistent with the holding in Lopez and less myopic than
Brzonkala.
B. The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act 125 (FACE) was en-
acted in order to protect a woman's constitutional right to choose whether
123 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303 (1964).
124 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385-86 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801, 1853-54; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63. The majority in
Lopez wrote:
Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the sub-
stantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce.... But to the
extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legisla-
tive judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate
commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked
eye, they are lacking here.
Id.
125 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994). The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act provides
criminal and civil penalties against anyone who:
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, inten-
tionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure,
intimidate or interfere with any person because that person is or has
been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or
any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive
health services;
(3) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a facility, or
attempts to do so, because such facility provides reproductive health
services ....
Id. The act continues:
(d) Rules of Construction.-Nothing in this section shall be construed-
(1) to prohibit any expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing
or other peaceful demonstration) protected from legal prohibition by
the First Amendment to the Constitution;
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or not to have an abortion and to follow through on that decision. 126 The
impetus for FACE was the killing of a doctor outside of an abortion
clinic in Florida127 and the ensuing recognition that the "pro-life" or
"anti-choice" 128 campaign was both nationwide and violent. 129  FACE
was not designed to stem peaceful assemblies protesting or supporting
abortion; First Amendment rights are not intended to be implicated by130
FACE. It is, however, intended to deter the bombings, violent physi-
cal attacks, and other threats imposed by anti-abortion demonstrators on
clinics and patients. 131
Federal legislation was necessary because either state action was in-
adequate or local police were unwilling to stop the protesters or protect
the patients and their providers.132 Furthermore, existing federal statutes
(e) Definitions.-as used in this section:
(2) Interfere with.-The term "interfere with" means to restrict a
person's freedom of movement.
(3) Intimidate.-The term "intimidate" means to place a person in
reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to him- or herself or to
another.
(4) Physical Obstruction.- The term "Physical obstruction" means
rendering impassable ingress to or egress from a facility that pro-
vides reproductive health services... or rendering passage to or
from such a facility . . . unreasonably difficult or hazardous.
(5) Reproductive health services.-The term "reproductive health
services" means reproductive health services provided in a hospital,
clinic, physician's office, or other facility, and includes medical,
surgical, counseling or referral services relating to the human re-
productive system, including services relating to pregnancy or the
termination of a pregnancy.
Id.
126 See American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 646 (4th Cir. 1995). In
American Life, the court stated that FACE aims to protect and promote public safety and
health "by establishing Federal criminal penalties and civil remedies for certain violent,
threatening, obstructive and destructive conduct that is intended to injure, intimidate or
interfere with persons seeking to obtain or provide reproductive health services." Id.
127 See id.
128 There are many terms used to identify this side of the abortion debate: in this
Note, the terms pro-life, anti-choice, and anti-abortion will be used interchangeably.
129 See H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 9 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699,
706. This is evidenced in the findings made by Congress with a quote from Randall
Terry, the president of Operation Rescue (a national organization whose goal is to stop
abortions by any means available). See id. The congressional findings note Terry's
statement "that doctors are the 'weak link' in the provision of abortion services; and he
has vowed to make doctors' lives a 'living hell.'" Id.
130 See id. at 10, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 707.
131 See id.
132 See id.
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were not available as a result of a 1993 Supreme Court decision that held
that civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1985133 could not be used to
protect women's access to abortion clinics. 134 It was the nationwide ef-
fort of the protesters, however, that enabled the federal government to
regulate their activities under the Commerce Clause. Significantly, most
federal courts have agreed that FACE is valid, both before and after
Lopez. 
135
The first case to pass judgment on whether or not FACE is a valid
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power was American Life
League, Inc. v. Reno, 136 decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit prior to Lopez. Applying the traditional rational
basis test, the court determined that the findings of Congress regarding
the effects on interstate commerce were rational and therefore found that
use of the Commerce Clause was constitutional.137 Interestingly, al-
though this case was decided before Lopez, the court examined and
placed weight on the findings made by Congress before it enacted
FACE. 138  In concluding that protesters' violence interfered with inter-
state commerce, Congress relied, inter alia, on the following facts:
Many women travel across state lines to seek reproductive health care.
Reproductive health facilities engage doctors and other staff in an in-
terstate market. For example, Dr. David Gunn, who was murdered in
Florida... performed abortions in several states. [The] facilities buy
medical and office supplies that move in interstate commerce.
"Clinics have been closed because of blockades and sabotage and have
been rendered unable to provide services."
139
The court found that the findings rationally supported Congress's
conclusion that interstate commerce was being affected, especially in light
of such decisions as Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach.140 The Fourth
133 See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988). Section 1985 provides a cause of action when
there has been a conspiracy to interfere with a person's civil rights. See id.
134 See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1993)
(holding that the elements of a conspiracy are not met by the nationwide efforts of anti-
abortion protesters).
135 See United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 1995); Cheffer v. Reno,
55 F.3d 1517, 1521 (1lth Cir. 1995); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642,
647 (4th Cir. 1995).
136 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995).
137 See id. at 647. The court applied the rational basis test from Hodel, which may
still be valid after Lopez. See id. (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)).
138 See id. (recognizing the "extensive legislative record" with which Congress con-
cluded that interstate commerce was affected).
139 Id. (citations omitted).
140 See id.
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Circuit made a final poignant observation that FACE balanced the rights
of the protesters and the rights of the women and doctors using the clin-
ics, while still ensuring that violence would not become the solution to
this nationwide societal conflict. 141 In so stating, the American Life court
recognized that Congress had adopted a rational means of regulation in a
difficult and conflicted-filled area.
Although the next two cases to decide the legality of FACE came
down after Lopez, the courts hearing these cases still upheld the prece-
dent set in American Life. The court in Cheffer v. Reno 143 was faced
with the same situation as the court in American Life-a challenge b
anti-abortion activists to all aspects of the constitutionality of FACE.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit adopted the
reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in American Life, but not without examin-
ing the effects of Lopez on Commerce Clause analysis. 
1 45
The court distinguished the Gun-Free School Zones Act from FACE
with one observation; FACE regulated a commercial activity and the
Gun-Free School Zones Act did not. 14  That, combined with the exten-
sive findings made by Congress, was the basis upon which the court de-
cided that FACE was a legitimate use of Commerce Clause power.
147
The court also noted that it disagreed with United States v. Wilson,' 48 a
district court decision. 149
141 See id. at 656 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)). In recog-
nizing this balance, the Court wrote:
"There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily
subject for the common good. On any other basis organized society could
not exist with safety to its members" . . . . Congress acted to ensure that
violence and aggressive obstruction are not used as means of settling what
has become a loud and vexing public dispute.
The Access Act strikes a balance among competing rights holders ....
Id.
142 See American Life, 47 F.3d at 647, 656.
143 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995).
144 See id. at 1518.
145 See id. at 1519-20.
146 See id. at 1520.
147 See id. at 1520-21. The court examined the language in Lopez that stated that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act "neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a re-
quirement that the possession [of a firearm] be connected in any way to interstate com-
merce." Id. at 1520 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995)). The
court found that FACE did not fit that description. See id. Ratler, the court determined
that FACE fell under the auspices of the Commerce Clause because the "provision of re-
productive health services" is a commercial activity. Id.
148 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 1995).
149 See Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1521 n.6.
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The district court in Wilson held that because FACE regulated con-
duct affecting commercial entities and not the entities themselves, the Act
was not a valid use of Commerce Clause power.' 50  Incidentally, when
Wilson was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, the district court was reversed, and the Seventh Circuit was
the next court to uphold the constitutionality of FACE.
151
In Wilson, anti-abortion protesters were being prosecuted under
152FACE for interfering with access to clinics and intimidating patients.
Applying the three-prong analysis from Lopez, the court held that FACE
was a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the third cate-
gory, as a regulation of activity that substantially affects commerce.153
The court of appeals found the congressional findings regarding the op-
eration of reproductive health facilities in interstate commerce to be
"plainly rational." ' 54 The court also adopted the reasoning of the Ameri-
can Life court, which recognized that the regulatory means were rea-
sonably related to permissible ends, the second part of the rational basis
analysis as required by Hodel.155 The Wilson court also agreed with the
150 See Vlson, 880 F. Supp. at 623 (holding FACE unconstitutional).
151 See United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 1995).
152 See id. The protesters blockaded the entrances to a women's health clinic by
wedging cars in the doors, wedging themselves into the cars, and sealing themselves in
bizarre contraptions. See id. The court described their extremist tactics:
Three defendants welded themselves into the [car] with an interlocking
steel apparatus. The upper body of one defendant protruded through a
hole cut in the floor of the [car] and his lower body was on the ground un-
derneath the car....
... The other three defendants welded themselves in various posi-
tions to and in the second car. One... [was] restrained by a welded steel
device confining his head in a steel harness, which was locked around his
head by placing a car jack inside a hollow steel pipe. Another... was in
a hole cut in the passenger-side floorboard, with his lower body resting on
the pavement and his upper body confined inside an electric clothes dryer.
His head was restrained in a locked harness secured around his throat.
The third defendant was in the right rear passenger seat with his arm en-
cased and handcuffed inside a steel pipe.
Id.
It took firefighters four and a half hours to remove the defendants (who also dis-
played anti-abortion signs outside the clinic) by various means, including blowtorches and
hydraulic equipment. See id. Because of the blockade, 12 women were prevented from
receiving services at the clinic. See id. The federal government subsequently charged
the defendants with violations of FACE. See id.
153 See id. at 680.
154 See id. at 680-83.
155 See id. at 680. The court found especially persuasive the "five permissible ends"
that were enunciated by the Fourth Circuit:
(1) protecting the free flow of goods and services in commerce, (2) protect-
ing patients in their use of the lawful services of reproductive health facili-
ties, (3) protecting women when they exercise their constitutional right to
A A
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distinction made in American Life between the Gun-Free School Zones
Act and FACE 156 and found a further distinction in the congressional
findings regarding the effects on interstate commerce in enacting
FACE. 157  The court concluded that the district court overstepped its
bounds by not deferring to the rational findings made by Congress.
158
The court announced that this deference, which has always been required
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, is still necessary even after Lopez. 1
59
This decision applied both a traditional Commerce Clause analysis and
the Lopez reasoning, making the court's holding both current and con-
vincing.
The most recent decision regarding the constitutionality of FACE,
Hoffman v. Hunt, 16  was not in accordance with the above-mentioned
courts of appeals decisions. 16 1 The persuasive value of Hoffman, how-
ever, is undermined because the circuit in which the district court sits had
already decided the issue in American Life. 162 Thus, the district court
contradicted the binding precedent set by its appellate court.
In Hoffman, anti-abortion activists were seeking a declaratoryjudg-
ment regarding FACE and a parallel North Carolina state statute. 163 The
court's analysis relied heavily on Lopez, specifically the substantial rela-
tion test. 164 The Hoffman court did not find Congress's determinations to
choose an abortion, (4) protecting the safety of reproductive health care
providers, and (5) protecting reproductive health care facilities from physi-
cal destruction and damage.
Id. at 680 n.6 (citing American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir.
1995)).
See id. at 683. Recall that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Cheffer v. Reno decided that providing health services is a commercial activity,
whereas the regulated activity in Lopez was not. See Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517,
1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995).
157 See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 685. The court opined that the true relevance of Lopez was
that "it helps define the line between what Congress may regulate and what it may
not.... [lit did what had not been done for decades. But the Supreme Court left intact
and relied on decades of Commerce Clause jurisprudence." Id. at 685-86.
155 See id. at 688.
159 See id. at 688-89.
160 923 F. Supp. 791 (W.D.N.C. 1996).
161 Compare id. with Wilson, 73 F.3d at 680 and Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1521 and Ameri-
can Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1995).
162 See American Life, 47 F.3d at 647.
163 See Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 794. The initial challenge was to the state statute
and its supposed violation of the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. See id. FACE was
signed into law while the case was pending, and the court allowed the plaintiffs to file an
amended complaint. See id. American Life and Lopez were decided while a motion to
sta76r filed by the United States as intervenor, was in effect. See id. at 795.
See id. at 806. The district court, contrary to the analyses given by other federal
courts, interpreted Lopez as creating new, more narrow, law in defining Congress's
Commerce Clause power. See id. at 806-07.
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be persuasive, analogizing them to the findings in Lopez that were insuf-
ficient to uphold the Gun-Free School Zones Act. 165 Judge Potter stated
that the court was of the opinion that Congress enacted FACE on the
very arguments rejected in Lopez.16
This is the second weakness of the court's decision, but like the
Brzonkala court, the Hoffman court only compared the case before it to
Lopez. 16  It failed to utilize the complete Commerce Clause analysis,
which Lopez clearly enunciated was still a part of Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence. 6 8 The court completely refuted the findings of Congress by
remarking that there was a complete lack of evidence that the protest ac-
tivities had an actual or probable effect on interstate commerce.1 69 In so
stating, the Hoffman court rebuked not only its immediate superior
court, 170 it also derided the opinions from the Seventh and Eleventh Cir-
cuits. 171 In closing, the court stated that "[n]othing in this decision, or in
Lopez, implicates the wide range of activities that Congress has regulated
via its commerce power and can still regulate consistent with Lopez."172
These words are far from reassuring in light of the rest of the decision.
Ultimately, it seems that FACE has a stronger commercial flavor
than does VAWA, which makes it more likely that FACE will be upheld,
regardless of the conflict between the federal courts' decisions. Two im-
portant points also support the validity of FACE. First, courts of appeals
165 See id. at 807. The district court did not give weight to any of Congress's find-
ings; instead of affording the traditional deference to Congress, it found reasons why each
finding could be inadequate. See id. at 807-10. For instance, the court wrote, "[in fact,
FACE is not aimed at the commercial activity of abortion clinics. It is aimed at the basic
freedom of individuals to engage in civil protest." Id. at 809. The court seems to ignore
willfully the words of Congress that said specifically that FACE was intended to stem all
violence in connection with the ongoing abortion debate, not inhibit the right of either
side to protest peacefully. See H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 10 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 707.
16 See Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 812.
167 See id. at 806-19.
168 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
169 See Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 815.
170 See American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 656 (4th Cir. 1995).
171 See United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 1995); Cheffer v. Reno,
55 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir. 1995). The district court adds insult to injury by minimiz-
ing the actual effects of the protesters' violence on abortion and other women's health
activities. See Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 814-15. For example, the court wrote that
"there is really no significantly probative evidence showing the degree, if any, to which
these activities have actually reduced abortion-related commerce." Id. at 814. Commen-
tary such as this flies in the face of the extensive record accompanying the enactment of
FACE, which included empirical data about the effects on interstate commerce. See gen-
eralTi H.R. REP. No. 103-306 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699.
Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 819.
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have upheld the statute both before and after Lopez.173 Thus, assuming
arguendo that Lopez will narrow the band of activity that Congress may
regulate under the Commerce Clause, FACE still falls within the range of
permissibly regulated activity. 174  Second, commercial activity is being
regulated, and Congress made substantial findings about the effects that
the protesters' activity has on interstate commerce.175  The dicta from
Lopez seems to imply that congressional findings will be important in
determining whether Congress has acted within its enumerated powers.176
The real question is whether courts will still defer to congressional find-
ings or whether stricter scrutiny will be applied in upcoming cases. Un-
der current rational basis review, FACE would likely pass constitutional
muster. The importance of the dicta in Lopez, however, remains to be
seen, and it could affect the constitutionality of VAWA.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICY
The issue, therefore, is whether FACE and VAWA will survive ju-
dicial scrutiny in light of Lopez and current fluctuating Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. The majority of cases indicate that FACE will be up-
held, 177 but the law on VAWA is less certain. 78 Ultimately, however,
there is more to consider in determining the soundness of a statute.
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, Congress not only con-
sidered the breadth of its constitutional power but also heeded the weight
of the social problem it was facing and the need to address problems on a
national level. 179  Similarly, both FACE and VAWA seek to rectify
problems of national societal import, and policy concerns constitute a
large part of the record created by Congress for each statute.'
80
173 See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 680; Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1521; American Life, 47 F.3d at
656.
174 See Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520 (stating that FACE does regulate commercial activ-
See id. See generally H.R. REP. No. 103-306 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 699.
176 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995).
177 See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 680; Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1521; American Life, 47 F.3d at
656.
178 Compare Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 793
(W.D. Va. 1996) (declaring VAWA unconstitutional) with Jane Doe v. John Doe, 929 F.
Sum. 608, 610 (D. Conn. 1996) (opining that VAWA is constitutional).
See GUNTHER, supra note 8, at 149. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy said,
"'there is an injustice that needs to be remedied. We have to find the tools with which to
remedy that injustice.'" Id. Senator Pastor said, "'I believe in this bill, because I believe
in the dignity of man, not because it impedes our'" commerce. Id. at 150. The Senator
believed that the Fourteenth Amendment was a better source for the bill, but nonetheless
su 1 rted it as a matter of policy. See id. at 150-51.
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994
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These acts are analogous in three ways. First, each contains find-
ings that link the social-policy issue to the use of the Commerce
Clause.' s  Second, each addresses a problem that is national in scope. 18
2
Third, state statutes were not sufficiently rectifying either problem. 1
3
The similarities evidence important policy reasons for upholding FACE
and VAWA. Although policy alone cannot save legislation, it under-
scores the importance of following decisions that have upheld the consti-
tutionality of FACE and VAWA.
Each act contains congressional findings that point to widespread
problems. This has traditionally facilitated the Supreme Court's approval
of statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause. Findings are espe-
cially important in the aftermath of Lopez because of the dicta that called
for findings clarifying how and why Congress was using the Commerce
Clause to enact social-policy 
legislation. 18
Furthermore, it has traditionally been the policy of the Supreme
Court to defer to Congress when the legislature addresses social-policy
issues under the Commerce Clause.1s6 The Commerce Clause has been
used to legislate against social evils such as firing unionized employ-
ees, 1  loan sharking,189 and of course, racial discrimination. 19 An im-
portant part of each of the decisions accompanying these statutes has been
the findings made by Congress regarding the chosen course of action. 190
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801, 1853.
181 See id.
182 See Jane Doe v. John Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 611 (D. Conn. 1996) (discussing the
findings Congress made regarding widespread domestic violence and the lack of an ade-
quate response).
183 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801, 1853.
184 See Deborah Jones Meritt, Commerce!, 94 MicH. L. REv. 674, 703 (1995)
(discussing the distinguishing features of Lopez, and noting that "Lopez lacked [the] aura
of national urgency" that historically persuaded the Court that Congress's actions were
pressing and necessary).
185 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995).
186 See Schweitzer, supra note 18, at 71-72 (examining whether Lopez will end the
traditional deference to congressional use of the Commerce Clause and deciding that
Lo ,ez is limited).
See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937) (upholding the
National Labor Relations Act).
188 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971) (upholding the Consumer
Credit Protection Act of 1968).
189 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (upholding the Civil Rights
Act of 1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964)
(same).
190 See Perez, 402 U.S. at 147 n.1. The Court relayed the findings made by Congress
about the dangers of loan sharking and its connection to organized crime. See id. The
Court recognized that " [eixtortionate credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may in
the judgment of Congress affect interstate commerce." Id. at 154.
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The Supreme Court has employed rational basis review and, thus, de-
ferred generally to congressional findings. 191 Courts are not even re-
quired to analyze such findings in order to uphold Commerce Clause
legislation. 192
There is no reason not to continue this traditional deference to Con-
gress when it has made extensive findings. The Court in Lopez, if any-
thing, only reinforced what the Court has done for over 100 years when
asked to examine legislation. 193 Extensive findings exist for both
VAWA and FACE; this provides a basis for upholding the constitution-
ality of both statutes. Each contains congressional findings regarding the
problem addressed and explains how commerce is affected. For instance,
in enacting VAWA, Congress wrote:
[C]rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse
effect on interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from
traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate busi-
ness, and from transacting with business, and in places involved, in
interstate commerce; crimes of violence motivated by gender have a
substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by diminishing na-
tional productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing
the supply of and the demand for interstate products .... 194
Lower courts have deferred to such findings in accordance with tradi-
tional Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which affords to Congress sig-
nificant deference. 1
95
A second policy reason for upholding FACE and VAWA is that
they address national issues. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is an obvious
example of federal legislation designed to address an urgent national
problem that states both could not and would not address. 196 The level of
racism and discrimination that was rampant in this country came to the
forefront of the collective American conscience with the landmark case of
Brown v. Board of Education. 197  No doubt this played a role in the
Court's decisions in Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach, in which the
Court recognized that Congress can legislate against moral and social
191 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981).
192 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995).
See id. at 558-59.
194 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801, 1853.
195 See Jane Doe v. John Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 615 (D. Conn. 1996).
196 See Smith, supra note 3, at 739-40 (noting the lack of comprehensive state civil
rights laws enacted between the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the lack of enforcement of such laws that did exist).
197 C. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (deciding that separate but equal education is inherently
unequal and thus unconstitutional).
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wrongs.1 98  Similarly, abortion and domestic violence, two issues that
bear largely on women's civil rights, have recently come to the attention
of mainstream America as national crises. 99
FACE was enacted after anti-abortion extremists murdered several
doctors who performed abortions. 200 As the court in United States v.
White0 1 recognized, Congress enacted FACE in response to clinics beset
by increasing violence that is the result of nationally, not locally, organ-
ized groups of protesters. 2°  Similarly, VAWA was enacted because do-
mestic violence has become a national epidemic.20 3
Some might argue that domestic violence is a private act affecting
individuals. Such an argument ignores the larger picture in which local
police and laws are insufficiently protecting women, just as, similarly,
they were insufficiently protecting African Americans until 1964.204 The
collective must be observed in order to understand the extensive damage
that battering does to women nationally. This national effect also in-
cludes economic and commercial issues because women who are battered
are frequently unable to work or even leave the home.
205
As a matter of national policy, it is also not socially useful for
courts to strike down legislation that protects women and their children
from gender-based crimes. Women have a constitutionally protected
right to make a decision regarding their reproductive abilitiesy a right
which FACE protects. Women have a right to be free from misogynistic
198 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). See
generally Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding the constitutionality
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as it applies to restaurants).
199 See Lisa M. Fitzgerald, The Violence Against Women Act: Is It An Effective Solu-
tion?, 1 How. ScROLL: THE SOc. JUST. REv. 46, 50 (1993) (drawing a small parallel
between the rape of women and the lynching of blacks in terms of civil rights violations).
200 See H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 6-7 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699,
703-04; see also Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520 (1lth Cir. 1995) (distinguishing
the enactment of FACE from the Gun-Free School Zones Act by the extensive legislative
findings that Congress made regarding the national affect on doctors, clinics, and female
patients); Meritt, supra note 184, at 724-26 (discussing the atmosphere in which FACE
was enacted).
201 893 F. Supp. 1423 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
W2 See id. at 1427.
20 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 381-87 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801, 1849-55.
204 See Jane Doe v. John Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 611 (D. Conn. 1996) (discussing the
findings Congress made about widespread domestic violence and the lack of an adequate
rernse).
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801, 1853.
2D6 See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that a
woman has a right to choose to terminate or maintain a pregnancy before the fetus is vi-
able and that the state may not place an undue burden upon that right).
19971
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violence, and VAWA legitimately advances that right. Congress chose
the Commerce Clause as the vehicle for protecting those rights, but that
does not make the legislation any less important or legitimate.
A third policy reason for upholding the validity of FACE and
VAWA is that state statutes do not suffice. To continue the analogy to
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 1960 platform of both major national
political parties stated, "[w]e recognize that civil rights is [sic] a respon-
sibility not only of States and localities; it is a national problem and a
national responsibility." 207 Similar words can be found in the findings
made by Congress for FACE and for VAWA. In enacting VAWA, Con-
gress couched the law in terms of women's civil rights and the lack of
sufficient protection for women:
Congress has found that crimes of violence motivated by gender
constitute bias crimes in violation of the victim's right to be free from
discrimination on the basis of gender; current law provides a civil
rights remedy for gender crimes committed in the workplace, but not
for crimes of violence motivated by gender committed on the street or
in the home; State and Federal criminal laws do not adequately protect
against the bias element of crimes of violence motivated by gender
208
Federalists might argue that this is simply the federalization of
crime, similar to the Gun-Free School Zones Act that was struck down in
Lopez. There, however, Congress made no findings regarding the lack
of state gun-control laws before enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act;
in VAWA, the findings are more than adequate. A more apt analogy is
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which also sought to rectify a shameful
lack of local protection by establishing a federal law. Like the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, VAWA is a response to that lack of protection, pro-
tection which is desperately needed for women who are victims of gen-
der-motivated crime.
Similarly, before enacting FACE, Congress made findings regarding
the inadequacy of state and local laws. The court in United States v.
White °9 discussed the history of violence against clinics, patients, and
providers:
The [Senate] Report further emphasized that existing laws are inade-
quate to redress these problems. Some jurisdictions have refused to
respond at all to clinic violence and blockades. Even those that have
responded have found it difficult if not impossible to reach across
M7 See S. REP. No. 872, at 8 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2362.
M8 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801, 1853.
W9 893 F. Supp. 1423 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
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state lines to prosecute the individuals or groups responsible for
planning the actions.
2 10
These findings underscore that state and local responses to violence
against abortion clinics, abortion providers, and women were simply in-
adequate. Like the problems addressed by the Civil Rights Act of
1964-where even if states did respond to the problem it was not
enough-so too here did Congress have to recognize serious societal
problems and react accordingly. As a matter of tradition and policy, the
federal government must recognize social ills that are not being addressed
on the local level and that uniformly affect all Americans, not just local
residents. Given the severity of the crimes addressed in VAWA and
FACE, it is important that federal courts continue to uphold these stat-
utes.
IV. CONCLUSION
While Lopez is noteworthy as the first case in sixty years to strike
down legislation passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause, it is not a
complete turnaround in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Two areas of
Lopez will be important for future legislation: the dicta calling for con-
gressional findings to support the legislation and the third prong of the
analysis, the substantial relation test. Courts are still uncertain about this
latter standard, "whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' in-
terstate commerce." 211  The crucial issue will be how expansively the
Supreme Court interprets the idea of commerce. FACE and the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 addressed activity related to commerce-the provision
of health care and the service industry, respectively. VAWA, however,
while addressing activity that substantial effects commerce, does not di-
rectly regulate commerce. It remains to be seen how the Court will con-
tinue to refine and interpret Lopez. The consensus, though, among lower
federal courts is that deference to Congress is still the correct ap-
proach.2 2 Lopez is just another step in a long line of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Given this analysis, it is clear that FACE and VAWA
should be upheld. Adherence to stare decisis dictates that courts follow
precedent, and precedent, from long ago up until the cases upholding the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, mandates deference to the decisions of Con-
gress. Combined with the strong social-policy reasons for upholding
210 Id. at 1427 (citations omitted).
211 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
212 See United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 1995); Cheffer v. Reno,
55 F.3d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1995); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642,
656 (4th Cir. 1995); Jane Doe v. John Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 615 (D. Conn. 1996).
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these two statutes, it is clear that the courts that upheld the constitutional
validity of FACE and VAWA were right to do so.
Nicole Huberfeld
